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In a traditional agrarian sector tenancy contracts allow farmworkers
to produce and accumulate wealth. This is important in a dual economy
characterized in its modern sector by an high degree of credit imperfec-
tions . The wealth constrained workers can accumulate wealth by work-
ing as sharecroppers so that the next generation is able to invest in the
modern, more ef¿cient sector. We show that production in the traditional
sector inÀuences the modern sector and vice versa. Therefore the impact
of both agrarian reforms and monetary wealth redistributions have to be
evaluated regarding both the sectors and considering the possibility of in-
tersectorial migration. We will see that for land poor economies agrarian
reforms have an impact on the aggregate production while for land rich
economies this can be totally ineffective. Furthermore there are equilib-
ria where monetary wealth redistributions are preferred to the agrarian
reforms.
Keywords: Sharecropping contracts, credit imperfections, wealth accumulation, agrar-
ian reform, monetary wealth redistribution, dual economy, intersectorial migration.
JEL Classi¿cation: O12, O14, O20, Q15
1 Introduction
In a perfect world without wealth constraint all individuals choose the most pro¿table
investments and, to the extent that there is perfect information, a technology in the pro-
duction frontier is always chosen. Wealth constraints represent an important obstacle
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1for the full production ef¿ciency and the economic growth, and the more imperfect the
credit markets are, the less ef¿cient the economic exploitation of both physical and hu-
man resource. Many contributions (see Legros and Newman (1997) for a theoretical
analysis in a general equilibrium framework of asset allocation and wealth constraints)
have emphasized that in a less developed economy, where the credit markets are partic-
ularly imperfect or even non-existent, this is a fundamental barrier to the modernization
of the economy.
In the traditional rural economy, the social organization and, more particularly, the
nature of human relationships allows agents to overcome this problem. The literature
has already pointed out that in traditional societies, given the particularly close nature
of their relationship, individuals can better enforce credit contracts and overcome their
wealth barriers.
InarecentpaperBanerjeeandNewman(1998),consideringadualeconomy,showed
that this possibility of easy credit in the traditional economy can hamper the process of
transition to a modern one. They focus on the consumption credit which is easier to
obtain in the rural villages than in a more impersonal, urban economy. They claim that
an easy credit access in the traditional society makes it more appealing for individuals
to stay in the village rather than migrating toward more ef¿cient and modern ways of
production.
In this paper we consider this aspect on the “supply side”, namely that individuals
have an easier access to the production factors (in our case the land) in the rural rather
than in the modern economy, and we claim that this can be positive for the transition
of the whole economy. More precisely, we consider that poor dynasties who have
the possibility of producing in the rural economy can allow their future generations to
migrate toward more modern sectors. In order to characterize the traditional sector we
model a general tenancy contract and we show how the sharecropping contracts are
an endogenous agreement which arises when workers are wealth constrained and the
quantity of land per worker is low. We then analyze the role of this traditional kind of
agreement in promoting the economic development.
In order to endogenize the terms of tenancy contracts, we set a simple general equi-
librium model of a dual economy and we analyze how initial conditions on wealth and
land distribution affect the ef¿ciency of the economy in the long run equilibrium. To
determine long run equilibria, we perform an exercise of intergenerational wealth ac-
cumulation and we investigate the link between tenancy contracts and the size of the
modern sector. This type of exercise allows us to consider the role of both the agrar-
ian reform (which in this paper we consider as a land redistribution) and the wealth
redistribution in promoting the modernization of the economy and the ef¿ciency of the
agrarian sector. We will show that two kinds of long term equilibria are possible.
The equilibrium with “low modernization” where all tenancy contracts are inef¿-
2cient. In this case the high level of land demand causes a high level of rent and a long
run inef¿ciency in the agrarian production. The land ownership in this case is important
for the dynasties because: i) it allows them to produce more ef¿ciently when they are in
the traditional sector ii) it represents an “insurance” for the absentee owners’dynasties
who can ¿nance their investment in the modern sector with the revenue from their
rented lands. Therefore, even when these dynasties are not successful in the modern
sector they can still supply wealth to their offsprings and allow them to invest in the
modern sector. In this case an agrarian reform has the positive effect of increasing the
number of dynasties that bene¿t from these two effects.
In the equilibrium with “high modernization” all the tenancy contracts are ¿rst best
ef¿cient because there is not rent from the land. Given this ef¿ciency the quantity of
individuals in the modern sector is maximum. In this case both the wealth and the land
distribution cannot have any impact on the two sectors. Therefore a policy of wealth
redistribution and an agrarian reform cannot improve the ef¿ciency in the economy.
The economy reaches this kind of equilibria when the quantity of land per person is
high.
Furthermore we point out that in some cases it is possible with a wealth distribution
or with an agrarian reform to move the economy from the ¿rst to the second equilib-
rium. In that way it is possible to improve the modernization of the economy and the
ef¿ciency of the tenurial contracts. Finally we will show that for some given initial
conditions only one of the two policies has an impact on the long run equilibrium.
The importance of wealth distribution on the modernization of the economy seems
to be supported by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) who showed that the index of land con-
centration has a signi¿cant negative effect on the growth rate of the economy. Their
theoretical argument was that a higher level of inequality hampers growth because in-
dividuals will vote for more inef¿cient redistribution policies, and the land distribution
is used as a proxy for the wealth. Nevertheless, in their subsequent empirical analysis
the democratic countries are not more sensitive to the coef¿cient of land concentration
than the dictatorships. This leads them to conclude that this negative coef¿cient might
be due to a different explanation.
There is also some empirical evidence of the result that agrarian reforms did not
have an important positive impact on the “land rich”economies. As Moene (1994)
pointed out, agrarian reforms tend to be more successful in regions where the quantity
of land per capita is lower. To give an example, in China and in Taiwan in which their
respective land reforms are traditionally considered successful, the crop land per capita
is 0.10 and 0.06 hectares respectively. On the other hand, the land reforms of Mexico
and Peru do not seem to have had any important impact on their respective economies,
and the crop land per capita of these countries is respectively 0.31 and 0.19 hectares.
1.1 Literature review
The observation that wealth constrained individuals need to accumulate wealth before
realizing any projects is present in a paper of Gathak, Morelli and Sjöström (1997).
3In this paper this necessity might be a positive incentive for young individuals to work
harder (American dreameffect). The fundamental difference with ourpaper isthat they
consider that the modern sector is always able to give a job to young people to enable
them to accumulate wealth, whereas in our paper the only way to accumulate wealth is
to work in a traditional sector. The idea of the American dream effect can better apply
to an already developed economy, while our paper can be more usefully related to a less
developed economy.
Ourworkisalsorelatedtothe literature onwealthdistributionandgrowth. Inpartic-
ular Aghion and Bolton (1997) emphasize the same idea that a more egalitarian wealth
distribution allows more individuals to invest when the production activity requires an
initial wealth level. The difference is that they consider only one sector in which there
is a positive externality in producing more wealth because this increases the supply of
funds for investments. Consequently in Aghion and Bolton’s paper the distribution of
wealth always has the effect of improving this process, while in our model for some
initial conditions wealth and land distribution does not have any effects.
Another contribution which focuses on the effect of wealth distribution and growth
is Banerjee and Newmann (1993). They show that if wealth distribution is not too
unequal the economy ends up in an equilibrium of “prosperity”. Vice versa, when there
are a lot of poor and only few rich, the economy can fall in a poverty trap equilib-
rium. Also in this paper the role of the land market and of the agrarian reform is not
considered.
The problem of the agrarian reform is often related to the problem of the ef¿ciency
of sharecropping contracts 3. In an extremely simplifying way we can distinguish two
different considerations which have very different political economy implications. The
¿rst consideration is that workers in the agrarian sector are poor and the information
asymmetries are particularly pervasive, therefore sharecropping contracts are consid-
ered as a second best way to provide the land for the farmers 4. The second consid-
eration is that this is based on a difference of skills5 or attitude toward the risks6 of
landlords and farmers, therefore sharecropping can result in being an optimal device
for labor division or risk sharing.
In the ¿rst approach the landlord obtains an unproductive rent, so doing away with
him is only an improvement. In the second approach the problem is to consider how
important the role of the landlord is in the production process and whether the farm
workers, who become richer after the land reform, can substitute him.
The present paper belongs to the ¿rst framework (even if in the conclusive section
we will do some considerations related to the second line). Nevertheless, we not only
consider the relation between agrarian reform and agrarian sector as it is generally done
￿ For a survey on this argument see Banerjee (1998)
e See Banerjee, Gertler and Gathak (1998)
D See Eswaran and Kotwal 1985




in literature, but we also are interested in the inÀuence the traditional agrarian sector
has on the modern one.
This same relationship is considered in Moene (1992). As in our paper, he considers
the impact of land demand and supply on the rent and on the ef¿ciency in production,
but he does not consider the role of the agrarian sector in the modernization of the
economy and he focuses more on the effect on urban and rural poverty. Furthermore, in
his paper the wealth of individuals has an important impact on agrarian production, but
does not have effect on the possibility of being employed in the modern sector.
2 The Model
We consider an economy with a continuum of risk neutral agents of total mass 1. In
this section and in the next we take a one period model, from third section on we
will consider the dynamic model with in¿nite times. Production can take place both
in a modern industrial and in a rural agrarian sector. We will call these two sectors
respectively M-sector and T-sector.
In T-sector individuals produce by using a plot of land and effort, in the M-sector
capital is the only production factor. The set of plots of land is a continuum and has
am e a s u r eO?4 . We suppose that a measure R  O of the land is owned by R
individuals (hereafter owners) . The rest is owned by another class of individuals that
we will refer to as “landlord”. We suppose that the number of these individuals is ¿nite
and they are morethanone. They are not able tosupply anyeffort. The land distribution
is depicted in ¿gure 1
T h er e s to f4  R individuals (that we will call hereinafter “Workers”) can produce
in the T-sector by renting a plot of land either from a landlord or from an absentee
owner. The output for each plot of land is uncertain and the revenue is given by:
tW @

4> with probability h
3> with probability 4  h (1)
The probability of success is inÀuenced by an unobservable individual effort h .F o r
computational simplicity, let us suppose that the cost of effort has the following func-
tional form: h5
5￿W . It is negatively correlated to the exogenous technological parameter
5W 5 +3>4, therefore his optimal level will be a function h￿+W,. Consequently the
probability of being successful is a function of the effort and of the exogenous parame-
ter W .
Furthermore, let us suppose that beside its value as production factor, each single
plot of land gives to its owner a non monetary utility x. We can think of this value as
social prestige of owning land.
In the M-sector we abstract from every agency problems and the probability of suc-
cessis only determinedbya completelyexogenousidiosyncratic shock with probability
W . Accordingly, they invest a ¿xed amount n and they obtain:
tW @

|> with probability Q
3> with probability 4  Q
(2)
Where | 5? . isanexogenoustechnologicalparameter. Wesupposethatanindividual
in the M-sectorcan always “runaway” after the production takes placesand without risk
of being caught. Therefore there is not credit market in this sector.
The success in the T-sector is determined by the level of effort and the exogenous
parameter U , in the M-sector the determinant of the positive result is only the ex-
ogenous parameter Q . For simplicity we can suppose that the idiosyncratic shock is
common to the overall economy and consequently that W @ P @  7. This value
gives a measure of the aggregate productivity of the economy. Alternatively we can
think that its value is cyclical and depends on the economic conjuncture.
Individuals achieve maximum utility in the T-sector when they obtain ex post the
total production. In this case the expected utility is ￿
5. We suppose that the M-sector
is more ef¿cient than the T-sector so that if all individuals were not wealth constrained
they would prefer to produce in the M-sector. Therefore we make the following funda-
mental assumption:
Assumption 1 The pro¿ti nt h eM -sector is larger than the maximum pro¿tt h a ta n
individual can obtain in the T-sector, accordingly |A4
5 . n
￿ .
2.1 Wealth and land distribution
From assumption 1 only individuals with wealth z?nproduce in the T-sector . All
poor individuals produce in their own land if they are owners, otherwise they can de-
mand a land on the rental market and sign a contract with a landlord or an absentee
(rich) owner. Given a wealth distribution and a land distribution we can determine the
land supply and demand in the land rental market. The land supply is equal to all lands
. Paramethers k- an k￿ when different allow to consider separatly redditivity and
risk of any investment. In the present paper we abstract from this kind of consideration
since we suppose that all individuals are risk neutral.
6owned by landlords plus the land owned by the individuals with z  n, while the land
demand is equal to the mass of workers with wealth z?n .
We start with a very simple bivariate wealth-land distribution. Like we already
saw, agents are different according to whether they are owners or not, furthermore we
suppose that individuals can be either “monetary poor” with 0 wealth or “monetary
rich” with wealth z @ z  n.
Therefore we have the following land-wealth distribution:
1. +4  R,+4  $r, agents with no land and wealth 3.
2. +4  R,$z agents with no land and wealth  z.
3. R+4  $r, agents with land and wealth 3.
4. R$r agents with land and wealth  z .
Since we supposed that  z  n , all rich agents can produce in the M-sector (owners
and not). Furthermore let us suppose that nA￿
7 . x , this rules out the possibility
for the owners to sell the land and produce in the M-sector. Finally, let us assume that
$r  $z . In the next section we will endogenize these terms and we will see that
when wealth accumulation is endogenous it will never be possible that $r ?$ z.
3 Static equilibria and tenancy contracts
Rich owners and landlords supply the land in the rental market, accordingly the land
supply is:
V+O>R>$r,@O  R+4  $r, (3)
All poor workers demand for land then:
G+P>$z,@+ 4 R,+4  $z, (4)
Comparing (3) and (4) we have the following:
3.1 Tenancy contract
Letusstarttoconsiderthecasewherethereisanexcessoflanddemand: V+O>R>$r, ?
G+R>$z, . Landlords and owners have all the bargaining power and the value of the
outside option for the poor workers is 3. Since workers have wealth 3 they can only pay
ex-post the total amount needed to obtain the land.
The value of the ex-post payment and the decision whether to rent or to sell the land
is entirely chosen by landlords and owners who want to maximize their expected utility:
7pd{
v>yo5i3>xj
h+v>y,v . y (5)
where yo @3if owners or landlords sell the land yo @ x if they rent it and , therefore,
still enjoy the non monetary utility x .T h el e v e lo fh is notobservable therefore workers
will:




Maximizing (5) in the set 6 it is easy to see that: v￿ @ 4
5 : landlords and owners
prefer to leave half of the production to the workers in order not to disincentive them
too much. Since the workers will obtain only half of the production, there will be a
distortion and the level of effort is suboptimal and equal to ￿
5. Moreover y￿
o @ x :
landlords and owners prefer to keep the ownership and not to sell the land because, in
order to give better incentive to the workers, they prefer that their payment is totally
contingent to the ¿nal result (if they had sold the land for an ex-post payment then
workers would have obtained the utility x independently from the ¿nal outcome).
We consider now an excess of land supply: V+O>R>$r, AG +R>$z, . In this
situation workers have all the bargaining power:
pd{
yz5i3>xj>v>h




In Appendix we see that: v￿ @3and y￿
z @3 . Workers prefer not to buy the
land because they do not want to pay any ex-post amount. This happens because they
are fully residual claimants and can obtain all the surplus deriving from their effort h.
Therefore if they have to pay an amount equal to the utility x ex-post, their level of
effort will not be optimal anymore and they will entirely pay the inef¿ciency of the
contract.
Finally, when V+O>R>$r,@G+R>$z, , we have a situation of bilateral monopoly
with the level of expected rent which ranges in the interval ^3> ￿
7`. The right limit of the
interval being the expected rent when v @ 4
5 .
Considering what we said we have the following:
Lemma 1 When O  4  R+$r  $z,  $r there is excess of land demand and the
level of effort is suboptimal . When OA4  R+$r  $z,  $r there is excess of land
supply and the level of effort is ¿rst best ef¿cient h￿ @ .
Thislemma pointsout thatinour model the termsofthetenurial contract dependen-
dogenouslyonthewealthandlanddistributiondeterminedbythevectori$r>$z>R>Oj
8. As we saw, the reason is simple: rich individuals prefer to migrate to the modern sec-
tor and this determines the land supply and demand. Therefore we can argue that in
order to consider the ef¿ciency of the tenancy contracts it is important to take account
of the intersectorial migration between sectors and, consequently, the wealth-land dis-
tribution across individuals .
More in general, this lemma is an application to a developing economy of the con-
cept expressed by Legros and Newmann (1997). They show that in a general equilib-
rium framework, when there are wealth constraints ef¿ciency of the contract depends
on wealth distribution. In the next section we endogenize the wealth distribution with
a simple dynamic of intergenetational accumulation . Long run equilibria will depend
on the production level in the two sectors and for lemma 1 on the wealth distribution
in the preceding periods. Therefore we will determine the initial conditions which lead
the economy to the different equilibria. Finally we show how and when the economic
policies of redistribution improve the total ef¿ciency of the economy.
4 Long Run Equilibria
Let us suppose now that every individual has one offspring and individuals reproduce
themselves in¿nitely. In order to model the process of wealth accumulation in the
easiest possible way, we need to do some speci¿c assumptions on the timing the agents
invest and consume and on their preferences.
4.1 The dynamic model
Let us suppose that the life of every individual is subdivided in two periods. In the ¿rst
period individuals work, invest and consume, in the second they obtain the return on
their investment and split their wealth in consumption and bequest. We assume that the
utility function has the form:




Where f4 and f5 are the consumptions in the two subperiods and e is the bequest
the individuals leave to their offsprings ( @ +4  , is a factor of normalization) .
Given this function, in the second period the indirect utility function for all individuals
is t, for computational simplicity we multiply the cost function of effort by a factor ,
in that way the level of effort will be the same as in the preceding section. Moreover,
Assumption 1 has to be slightly modi¿ed as:
Assumption 1 bis |A4
5 . n
￿￿
9In the ¿rst subperiod of time w individuals invest to maximize the output t under the
wealth constant l . f4 @ ew￿4,w h e r eew￿4 is the bequest inherited. Furthermore, the
process of wealth accumulation will depend on the level of the rent, for both the owner
and the workers . Accordingly it will be:
ew @ tm+ew￿4>, (9)
Where the index m can be: “Owner” or “Worker”. Like we saw  depend on the
demand end supply and, consequently, on the wealth distribution. For this reason the
process of wealth accumulation is not stationary . For this reasons is impossible to
use the standard techniques (see Stockey Lucas 1989) and determine a limit wealth
distribution. Therefore we will describe this dynamic under the two possible situations
of excess of supply and excess of demand at time w  4.I nt h a tw a yw e¿nd the level
of demand and supply at time w and we can always see in which of the two market
equilibria (excess of supply or demand) the economy is.
The choice of investing in the M-sector depends on the wealth accumulation. From
the previous section we know that all individuals with wealth z   z prefer to invest in
the M-sector. Therefore, given our assumptions, all individuals who inherited a bequest
e   z will prefer the above sector.
Given that individuals do not save the not invested wealth, the bequest will always
be a portion of the production. When there is excess of land demand, the wealth that a
successful worker in the T-sector bequeaths is ￿
5 . Therefore, in order to allow individ-
uals that are not owners to change sector, we assume that the level of accumulation is
high enough, then :
Assumption 2 ￿
5  n
4.2 The rental market in the dynamic model
Given assumption 2, the dynamics of intersectorial migration between the two sectors
becomes quite simple and we can compute the measure of all dynasties of individuals
who are in the M-sector in both the market equilibria (excess of supply and excess of
demand), we will consider this measure as an index of modernization of the economy.
4.2.1 Excess of land demand
Let us start by considering the case of demand larger than supply at time w  4.T h e
contract that arises is a pure sharecropping contract in which either the landlords or the
absentee owners agree to split the ¿nal surplus with the workers in equal parts. Given
Assumption 2, dynasties of successful sharecroppers and of absentee owners whose
sharecropper was successful will work in the M-sector, given that they inherited ￿
5 .
The migration between w  4 and w of each dynasty of owners is described in the
following table :
10w>w  4 T-sector M-sector
T-sector Unsuccessful Unsuccesful and tenant Unsuccesful
M-sector Successful Successful or Unsuccesful and tenant Successful
At time w in the T-sector there are all the dynasties of owners who at time w  4
produced unsuccessfully in the same sector and who rented the land to an unsuccessful
tenant. Given that we are considering a continuum of individuals, the probability of
being successful can be considered as the proportion of successful workers on the total,
therefore the mass of owners in the T- sector is described by the following equation:
rW






Where with pl we indicate the total amount of owners in the sector l . Since the
term ￿
5 represents the probability of being successful for a sharecropper, the second
term of (43) represents the total amount of owners who came from the M-sector.
At thesametimeintheM-sector thereare alldynastiesofownerswhoweresuccess-
ful at w  4 plus the unsuccessful dynasties whose tenant was successful, accordingly:
rP






Let us consider now the workers. The behavior of their dynasties is depicted in the
following table:
w>w  4 Demand for land M-sector
Demand for land Unsuccessful or unemployed Unsuccessful
M-sector Successful Successful
In the M-sector there are all the successful dynasties of the preceding periods, ac-








Given that  is the probability of success in the M-sector and ￿
5 is the probability of
success for a sharecropper. The equation of dynasties of workers in the T-sector can be
derived residually recalling that we are considering the case in which at w  4 the land
demand was larger than the supply. Consequently, all the land is used by the owners
and the workers and the following equality has to be true:
zW
w￿4 @ O  rW
w￿4 (13)
In order to ¿nd the equations solutions of these last three equations we can solve
(10) for rP
w￿4 and substitute rP
w and rP
w￿4in (11). In that way we have the following
second order homogenous difference equation:
115










In appendix we solve this equation considering that the economy starts from a given
wealth and land distribution i$r
3>$z
3 >R3>Oj.
We substitute the equation for rW
w￿4 in (13) and we have the equation for zW
w￿4
. Substituting this last expression (see Appendix) in (12) and iterating we have the
dynamic equation for zP
w .
4.2.2 Excess of land supply
When there is excess of supply at a given time w￿. At time w￿ .4the dynamics of
migration are different, given that the absentee owners will not be able to obtain the
same amount from renting the land as before and workers produced more ef¿ciently at
time w￿. Therefore there are two opposite effects on the modernization. The negative
effect is due to the fact that owners that are not successful in the M-sector are obliged
to migrate into the T-sector, the positive effect is that now all individuals in the T-sector
can produce ef¿ciently.
The following table summarizes this dynamic for each owner or worker:
w>w  4 T-sector M-sector
T-sector Unsuccessful Unsuccesful
M-sector Successful Successful
The dynamic equations for the owners are:
rW
w @+ 4 ,R and rP @ R (15)
while for the workers:
zW
w @+ 4 ,+4  R, and zP @ +4  R,. (16)
4.3 Equilibria in the rental market
Given the dynamic equations for rP>r W>z P and zW in the two state (excess of de-
mand and excess of supply at time t-1) we are able to determine supply and demand at
w. As a result the dynamic version of the rental land demand of equation (4) is:
Gw @4 P  qQ
w (17)
and the dynamic version of the static land rental supply (3) is:
Vw @ O  pU
w (18)




w in (18) and (17) respec-
tively we have the following expressions (in Appendix the analytical form):
Gw @

g3+R>O,.g4+R>O>$r>$z>w, Gw￿4 AV w￿4





v3+R>O,.v4+R>O>$r>w, Gw￿4 AV w￿4
O  +4  ,RG w￿4 ?V w￿4
(20)
Given these expressions we are able to study the long run behavior of the economy
and we have the following:
Proposition 2 Given an initial wealth and land distribution iO>R>$r>$zj i) OA
7￿￿6 +5￿R,￿5￿+6.R,.￿5 +7.R,
7￿7￿.6 ￿5￿￿6 is a suf¿cient condition for the excess of land supply in
the long run. ii) OA+4  , is a necessary and suf¿cient condition for the excess of
land supply in the long run if for a given time w3 it is true that Vw3 AG w3
Proof:
Part i):
Let us consider ¿rst the case: G3 AV 3 .I f olpw$4 Gw+Gw￿4 AV w￿4, ?
olpw$4 Vw+Gw￿4 AV w￿4, (see appendix for their analytical expressions) given that
the two expression exists for all w 5i 3>4>===j it exists a w￿ such that Gw￿+Gw￿￿4 A
Vw￿￿4, ?V w￿+Gw￿￿4 AV w￿￿4, . Passing at the limits of the two equations and com-
paring the two asymptotic values we have that it exist a w￿ such that Gw￿ ?V w￿ if:
OA
7  6 +5  R,  5 +6 . R,.5 +7 . R,
7  7 .65  6 (21)
Since
7￿￿6 +5￿R,￿5￿+6.R,.￿5 +7.R,
7￿7￿.6 ￿5￿￿6 A 4   for all R 5 ^3>O` and  5 +3>4,,i t
is true that OA4  = At time w￿.4there will be  successful individuals in both the
sector. This is true because the contract at w￿ is ef¿cient and the probability of success
in both sectors is  . Therefore there will be 4   poor individuals who want to work
in the T-sector. Therefore IfOA4 there will be excess of supply also at time 4 and,
consequently, given that the same reasoning applies for time 2, 3,... also in the long run.
Therefore if olpw$4 Gw+Gw￿4 AV w￿4, ? olpw$4 Vw+Gw￿4 AV w￿4, it has to be true
that also olpw$4 Gw ? olpw$4 Vw.
Now we prove that if (54) is not true olpw$4 Gw A olpw$4 Vw.L e t u s d e ¿ne the
following function: Hw @ Gw+Gw￿4 AV w￿4,  Vw+Gw￿4 AV w￿4, . The following










Substituting the analytical expression for Hw , V3 and G3 it is possible to show that
(22) is true for all  and w .C a s e V3 AG 3 is true for the part ii) of the proposition
given that
7￿￿6 +5￿R,￿5￿+6.R,.￿5 +7.R,
7￿7￿.6 ￿5￿￿6 A 4  =
Part ii) :
LikewesawaboveifOA4andforagivenw3 it isVw3 AG w3 thenolpw$4 Vw A
olpw$4 Gw . Now let us suppose that O?4   if in a given time w3 it is Vw3 AG w3
at time w @ w3 .4 , Vw AG w because  is the total number of rich individuals. Since
O?4   condition (21) is not satis¿ed therefore olpw$4 Vw ? olpw$4 Gw . 
The function O+R,@
7￿￿6 +5￿R,￿5￿+6.R,.￿5 +7.R,
7￿7￿.6 ￿5￿￿6 corresponds at the line de of
¿gure 2. The area above this line represents the set of values of R and O such that
there is an excess of supply of land in a given long run equilibrium for whatever initial
wealth distribution. This line has a negative slope because for an higher R the quantity
of the land necessary to the economy to move to the second equilibrium is lower. The
reason is simple: the greater the number of the owners, the greater the number of indi-
viduals migrating to the modern sector. This happens for two reason: i) they can more
ef¿ciently produce and have a higher probability of being successful ii) when they are
in the M-sector, they have a higher probability than the landless workers to stay in this
sector because they can obtain the rent from their land. In other words, even if they are
not successful in the M sector, there is a positive probability that their tenant is success-
ful. This double task of the land can usefully related to the one considered in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). In this paper the land is also a collateral for the credit market. In
our paper we fucus on the role of land as a form of insurance.
The area between de andfg represents the area in which the equilibrium with excess
of land supply is still possible but the initial wealth-land distribution has to be such that:
V3 AG 3 (23)
or substituting the two terms and rearranging:
OAR +4  $r,.+ 4 $z,+4  R, (24)
in other words the initial number of poor in the economy has not to be too great.
When the demand exceeds the supply, there are two opposite effects: the positive
level of rent increases the number of owners in the M-sector while the subef¿ciency of
the contract decreases the mass of workers in the same sector. This happens if the mass
of individuals that have to work in the T-sector will be greater than the total quantity of
land in the economy. When the supply overcomes the demand, the amount of rent will















anymore and they go back to work on their own land. On the contrary workers can
produce more ef¿ciently in the T-sector, their probability of being successful increases
andtheirdemandforlandwill decrease. Thissituationofexcessofsupplyissustainable
in the long run if the total quantity of land is large enough, namely OA4   (area
above fg ).
T h ea r e ab e l o wfg represents the economy in which in the long run there will never
be excess of land supply and the contracts will always be inef¿cient.
4.4 Modernization
From proposition 1 we know that when O?4   the economy cannot be in an
equilibrium with excess of land supply in the long run. In this case the number of







 +5 . , R
5+ 5  . 5,
(25)
This equation is represented in the ¿rst graph of ¿gure 3. Like we said before the




M-sector  <L< 1-a 0 
Figure 3:
larger the number of owners is the larger is the total number of individuals migrating to
the modern sector. In this situation the land demand always exceeds the supply.
When the quantity of land per individuals is 4    O?O 5 condition (21) is
not satis¿ed for all R, therefore the economy is never in the equilibrium with “high
modernization” unless the initial number of rich individuals is such that $rR.$z+4
R, AO . In this case we can see from the right graphic of ¿gure 3 that the level will
permanently be at its maximum.
Anequilibriumwith an excessof landsupplyhasan higheref¿ciencyofthe T-sector
and a larger number of individuals in the M-sector than the equilibrium with excess
of land demand. When tenancy contracts become more ef¿cient there there are two
opposite effects on the migration. On one side the higher ef¿ciency allow the workers
to become rich with an higher probability, on the other side the absentee owners cannot
¿nance their production with the rent obtained from their tenants. Like ¿gure 3 shows
us the positive effect overcomes the negative and the long run modernization will be
higher.
Let us consider the area O4 ?O O5. From ¿gure 4 we can see that a more
equalitarian land distribution has the effect of leading the economy to the more ef¿cient
equilibriumandto attainthe maximumlevel ofmodernization. Thisistrue for whatever
level of initial wealth $r and $z. Moreover also a wealth distribution with an high
number of rich individuals has this same effect.
Finally let us consider a land rich economy with OAO 5 . In this case the land
supply is always larger than its demand and the number of individuals in the M-sector
is always at its maximum level.
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In this section we will see how an agrarian reform which increases R and how a one
shot wealth redistribution that increases $rand $z affect the internal ef¿ciency of the
T-sector and the modernization of the economy.
When O?4  , we can observe in Figure 3 that an agrarian reform which in-
creases R have the effect of increasing the investor in the M-sector but not of leading
the economy to the more ef¿cient equilibrium. This long run equilibrium is totally in-
dependent from the initial portion of rich individual, therefore transferring a lump sum
to poor individuals to affect the wealth distribution does not have consequences in the
long run.
After the agrarian reform all successful dynasties will leave the T-sector and they
sign an inef¿cient (because the demand exceeds the supply) sharecropping contract
with workers. Therefore in the period after the agrarian reform its impact on the total
ef¿ciency of the agrarian sector becomes smaller. In ¿gure 5 we can see the dynamic
effect of an agrarian reform that at the end of a given time t
Ø
distribute R5  R4 plot
of land to a same measure of poor individuals. The line 3H represents the long run
relationship between total owners and owners in the T-sector. This agrarian reform
increases the number of owner workers of a measure R5R4 at time t
Ø
.4= At time t
Ø
.5
the number of owners in the same sector will start to decrease and in the long run the
system will reach the equilibrium H￿￿. As we can see from ¿gure 5 the number of






.5  ===  rW
t
￿
.4 . Therefore in the following
periods an agrarian reform increases the number of owners in the T-sector of a lower
number than the dynasties who receive the land.














The agrarian reform has exactly the same effect than in the case before. However in
this case a wealth redistribution can push the economy to the more ef¿cient equilibrium
with the maximum level of modernization (level  in ¿gure 3 ). In this case the wealth
redistribution has a stronger positive effect than the agrariandistribution in both sectors.
When O5 ?O O4 both agrarian reform and wealth distribution have the same
effect of bringing the economy in the equilibrium with excess of supply and therefore
to maximize its modernization. Wealth redistribution increases the size of the M sector
and the ef¿ciency of the tenancy contracts agrarian reform which increases the number
of owners R  R￿ brings the economy to the equilibrium with “high modernization”
.
Finally (see ¿gure 4) when the land is abundant tenurial contracts are always ef¿-
cient. Consequently there is no way to improve the ef¿ciency by fostering the process
of migration, which is then at its maximum level. Therefore when the economy is rich
of land a policy of redistribution (either of land or of monetary wealth) does not raise
the ef¿ciency of the economy.
6 Final remarks
Developing economies are normally characterized by a rural traditional sector with a
18low ef¿ciency in the production and a modern more ef¿cient sector. In this paper we
considered that the wealth constraints hampers the process of transition to the modern
economy . Nevertheless we claim that the production in the traditional sector can help
the economy to overcome this barrier. The main goal of this paper is to show that
changes in traditional sectors have important impact also in the modern sector and,
consequently, on the process of modernization of the economy.
Thereforeeconomicpolicieshavetotakeaccountoftheirimpactonboththesectors.
In particular we saw that an agrarian reform in some cases has the effect of fostering
the modernization of the economy even if the effect on the traditional sector is less im-
portant than expected in the long run. On the contrary, in land rich economies, agrarian
reform is totally ineffective because the price of renting the land and the consequent
loss of ef¿ciency is low.
Moreover our model allowed us to distinguish two kinds of wealth redistribution:
of land and of monetary wealth. We showed that this two kinds of policies have dif-
ferent impact on the whole economy according to the ratio of land to individual. In an
economy where thisratio is lowagrarian reformsare better than monetary wealth distri-
bution. In economies where this relation is not too low a monetary wealth distribution
can be preferable. Finally in the economy rich of land with respect to people the two
policies are ineffective.
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Appendix A. The tenancy contract
We consider the contract when the land supply is larger than the demand and workers
have all the bargaining power.
The problem for the workers is:
pd{
h>yz





h+v,v @ yz (A-1)
yz 5i 3>xj (A-2)
Maximizing the ¿rst equation for the effort:
h￿+v,@+4  v, (A-3)
Substituting h￿ in (A-1) we have:




From (A-1) we substitute yz in (A-4). In that way we obtain:
+4  v,5 
+4  v,5
5
. +4  v,v (A-5)
Maximizing for v :
 +4  v,.+4  5v,@3 (A-6)
or:
v￿ @3 (A-7)
and from A-1 :
yz @3 (A-8)
Therefore workers prefer a ¿rst ef¿cient contract without ex-post payment and do not
want to become owners.
Appendix B. Solution of the dynamic system




w that Gw￿4 AV w￿4 . Let





























Given an initial wealth-land distribution iO>R>$r>$zj The initial conditions are:
pW
3 @+ 4 $r,R and pW
4 @+ 4 , R+4  $r,.+ 4 , R$ r+4  ￿
5,,w eh a v e
the following system solved by the two coef¿cients of the solution of (B-1):
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5  6 . 5
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5  6 . 5
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If we substitute the equation for rW
w in equation (13) we have:
rW
w @ O 

5  6 . 5
R
5   . 5  54￿w ++4  , ,
￿4.w R

5  6 . 5
5.  5 . $r

(B-8)




w￿4 . e . fgw (B-9)
with:



















+4  , 
5
= (B-11)
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If we substitute zP
w and rW





5  6 . 5
R
5   . 5 






























5 +5 . O  6R  5$z .5R$ z,. +O . R +6  $r,, . 5 +4.$z . R +$z . $r,,

5+ 4.5,
23Which are the analytical expression of the ¿rst equations of expressions (20) and (19) .
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